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                         14th Amendment

Intent

     "On the other hand, there is a significant historical fact in
all of this. Clearly, one of the purposes of the 13th and 14th
Amendments and of the 1866 act and of section 1982 was to give the
Negro citizenship. . ."  Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. (1967), 379
F.2d 33, 43.

     "It is true that the chief interest of the people in giving
permanence and security to citizenship in the 14th Amendment was
the desire to protect the Negroes."   Afroyim v. Rusk (1967), 18
L.Ed. 2d 758, 764.

     "The object of the 14th Amendment, as is well known, was to
confer upon the colored race the right of citizenship."  United
States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 692.

     "It would be a remarkable anomaly if the national government,
without the amendment, could confer citizenship on aliens of every
race or color, and citizenship, with civil and political rights, on
the "inhabitants" of Louisiana and Florida, without reference to
race or color, and cannot, with the help of the amendment, confer
on those of the African race, who have been born and always lived
within the United States, all that this law seeks to give them."
United States v. Rhodes (1866), 27 Fed. Cas. 785, 794.

"The amendment referred to slavery. Consequently, the only persons
embraced by its provisions, and for which Congress was authorized
to legislate in the manner were those then in slavery."  Bowlin v.
Commonwealth (1867), 65 Kent. Rep. 5, 29.

     "The only question, therefore, left for determination is the
constitutionality of Section I of the Civil Rights Act of April 9,
1866. Nothing in the Constitution of the United States, as
originally adopted, or in any of the first twelve amendments to
that instrument, adopted shortly after ratification of the
Constitution, would warrant the enactment of this Act by Congress."
United States v. Morris (1903), 125 Fed. Rep. 322.

     "It is claimed that the plaintiff is a citizen of the United
States and of this state. Undoubtedly she is. It is argued that she
became such by force of the first section of the 14th Amendment,
already recited. This, however, is a mistake. It could well be
claimed that she became free by the effect of the 13th Amendment,
by which slavery was abolished, for she was no less a citizen than
she was free before the adoption of either of these amendments. No
white person. . . owes the status of citizenship to the recent
amendments to the Federal Constitution.
     "The history and aim of the 14th Amendment is well known, and
the purpose had in view by its adoption, well understood. That
purpose was to confer the status of citizenship upon a numerous
class of persons domiciled within the limits of the United States
who could not be brought within the operation of the naturalization
laws because (of being) native born; and whose birth, though
native, had at the same time left them without the status of
citizenship. These persons were not white persons, but were, in the
main, persons of African descent who had been held in slavery in
this country or, if having themselves never been held in slavery,
were the native-born descendants of slaves."   Van Valkenberg v.
Brown (1872), 43 Cal. Sup. Ct. 43, 47. (Emphasis added.)

Not Affecting State Citizenship

     "After the adoption of the 13th Amendment, a bill which became
the first Civil Rights Act was introduced in the 39th Congress, the
major purpose of which was to secure to the recently freed Negroes
all the civil rights secured to white men. . . .(N)one other than
citizens of the United States were within the provisions of the
Act."  Hague v. C. I. O., 307 U. S. 496, 509.

     "No white person. . . owes the status of citizenship to the
recent amendments to the Federal Constitution."  Van Valkenbrg v.
Brown (1872), 43 Cal. Sup. Ct. 43, 47.

     "The amendment reversed and annulled the original policy of
the Constitution, which left it to each state to decide exclusively
for itself whether slavery should or should not exist as a local
institution, and what disabilities should attach to those of a
servile race within its limits. The whites needed no relief or
protection, and they are practically unaffected by the amendment."
United States v. Rhodes (1866), 27 Fed. Cas. 785 (No. 16,151), 794.

     "The rights of the state, as such, are not under consideration
in the 14th Amendment, and are fully guaranteed by other
provisions."  United States v. Anthony (1873), 24 Fed. Cas. 829
(No. 14,459), 830.

     "It appears upon the face of the amendment, as well as from
the history of the times, this was not intended to impose any new
restrictions upon citizenship, or to prevent any persons from
becoming citizens by fact of birth within the United States who
would thereby have become citizens according to the law existing
before its adoption."  United States v. Wong Kim Ark, supra, p.
676.

     "It is quite clear, then, that there is a citizenship of the
United States and a citizenship of a state, which are distinct from
each other and which depend upon different characteristics or
circumstances of the individual. . . . Of the privileges and
immunities of the citizens of the United States and of the
privileges and immunities of the citizen of the state, and what
they respectively are, we will presently consider; but we wish to
state here that it is only the former which are placed by this
clause under the protection of the Federal Constitution, and the
latter, whatever they may be, are not intended to have any
additional protection by this paragraph of the amendment."
Slaughter House Cases, supra, p. 408.

     "There can be no doubt. . . that the civil rights sometimes
described as fundamental and inalienable, which before the war
amendments were enjoyed by state citizenship and protected by state
government, were left untouched by this clause of the 14th
Amendment."  Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 96.

     "The 14th Amendment creates and defines citizenship of the
United States. It had long been contended, and had been held by
many learned authorities, and had never been judicially decided to
the contrary, that there was no such thing as a citizen of the
United States, except by first becoming a citizen of some state."
United States v. Anthony, supra, p. 80.

Congressional Authority Under Amendment

     "Under the 14th Amendment Congress has the power to protect by
appropriate legislation the freedom of speech and the other rights
enumerated in the first 8 Articles of Amendment."  United States v.
Hall (1871), Fed. Case No. 15,282.

     "The exercise of congressional authority under the enforcement
provision of the 14th Amendment, unlike the commerce clause, is not
limited by the 10th Amendment."  Remmick v. Barnes County (1977),
435 F.Supp. 914.

     "Power reserved to the States by the 10th Amendment is limited
by the 14th Amendment so that requirements of the Civil Rights Act
may be applied to municipalities."  Lowe v. Waukesha Joint School
District #1 Board of Education (1977), 560 F.2d 285. (Italics
added.)

     "Statutory law of the United States is part of the law of each
State just as if it were written into State statutory law."  People
v. Barajas, 147 Cal. Rptr. 195.

     "Naturalization" is a privilege."  United States v. Zgrebee,
38 F.Supp. 127, 129.

     "The opportunity to become a "citizen" is a privilege."
United States v. Shapiro, 43 F.Supp. 927. 929.

     "It may be conceded that this amendment gives the power to
Congress not only to protect the personal freedom of enfranchised
citizens but to remove from them every badge and restraint of
slavery and involuntary servitude.
     "Congress has by virtue of this amendment declared 'that all
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every state and territory. . . to give evidence. . .
as is enjoyed by white persons.'. . . Conceding, then, that
Congress has the power by virtue of the 13th Amendment to confer on
the persons enfranchised thereby the same right to testify as is
enjoyed by white persons,. . . (i)t would be an offense for two or
more colored persons, enfranchised slaves, to conspire with the
same purpose. . . .The ground of the decision was that the sections
referred to were broad enough, not only to punish those who
hindered and delayed the enfranchised colored citizen from voting
on account of his race, color, or previous condition of servitude,
but also those who hindered and delayed the free white citizen."
LeGrand v. United States, 12 Fed. Rep. 577, 580-582.

     "The utmost legal effort of the emancipating section was to
declare the colored as free as the white race in the United States.
It certainly gave the colored race nothing more than freedom. It
did not elevate them to social or political equality with the white
race. It neither gave nor aimed to give them, in defiance of state
laws, all the rights of the white race, but left them equally free
in all the states, and equally subject to state jurisdiction and
state laws. Without the second section, therefore, there could be
no pretext for a claim by Congress for special legislation for the
colored race which would be unauthorized in relation to the white
race of freemen.
     "And whatever may have been the unspoken aim of the second
section--freedom to all, and nothing more, was the only
constructive object, and is the inevitable effect of this section.
. . .To prevent any such frustration of the aim and effect of the
declared emancipation was obviously the object, and must be the
only legitimate effect of the second section. "Power to enforce
this article by appropriate legislation" can import nothing more
than to uphold the emancipating section, and prevent a violation of
the contemplated race. It could not mean that Congress should have
the power to legislate over their civil rights and remedies in the
states any more than over those of all citizens; and it certainly
does not squint at any such legislation as to white citizens."
Bowlin v. Commonwealth (1897), 65 Ky. Rep. 5, 8.

     "In United States v. Cruikshank, 1 Woods 308, 319,. . .  the
question was the constitutionality of the enforcement act. . .
which Mr. Justice Bradley declared to be unconstitutional, as an
unauthorized assumption of power by Congress under the 14th
Amendment, but in referring to the Civil Rights Act, in this cause
involved, expressing the following opinion: It was supposed that
the eradication of slavery and involuntary servitude of every form
and description required the slave should be made a citizen and
placed on an entire equality before the law with the white citizen,
and, therefore, that Congress had the power, under the amendment,
to declare and effectuate these objects. The form of doing this, by
extending the right of citizenship and equality before the law to
persons of every race and color (except Indians not taxed, of
course, excepting the white race, whose privileges were adopted as
the standard,. . .  "  United States v. Morris, supra, p. 237.

     "The privilege or immunity asserted in the Slaughter House
Cases was the freedom to pursue a common business calling, alleged
to have been infringed by a state monopoly statute. It should not
be forgotten that the court, in deciding the case, did not deny the
contention of the dissenting justices that the asserted freedom was
in fact infringed by the state law. It rested its decision, rather,
on the ground that the immunity claimed was not one belonging to
persons by virtue of their citizenship; "that there is a
citizenship of the United States, and a citizenship of a state,
which are distinct from each other, and which depend on different
characteristics in the individual." And it held that the protection
of the privileges and immunities clause did not extend to those
"fundamental" rights attached to state citizenship which are
peculiarly the creation and concern of state governments and which
Mr. Justice Washington, in Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 371,
6 Fed. Cas. No. 3,230, mistakenly thought to be guaranteed by
Article IV, section 2, of the Constitution. The privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States, it was pointed out,
are confined to that limited class of interests growing out of the
relationship between the citizen and the national government
created by the Constitution and federal laws. That limitation upon
the operation of the privileges and immunities clause has not been
relaxed by any later decisions of this court."  Hague v. C. I. O.,
supra, p. 520, note 1.

Privileges and Immunities pursuant to a franchise Under 14th
Amendment

     "Naturalization" is a privilege."  United States v. Zgrebee,
38 F.Supp. 127, 129.

     "The opportunity to become a "citizen" is a privilege."
United States v. Shapiro, 43 F.Supp. 927. 929.

     "No statute of Arkansas inhibits persons described as
belonging to 'low and lawless type of humanity' coming into the
state. Under the 14th Amendment, and under the interstate commerce
clause, of the Constitution, they now have that right [privilege]."
State of Arkansas v. Kansas & T. Coal Co., 96 F. 353. (Emphasis and
insertion added.)

     "The Federal Civil Rights Statutes created rights which may be
protected by federal courts in the exercise of their normal equity
jurisdiction."  Progress Development Corp. v. Mitchell (1960), 182
F.Supp. 681, 711. (Emphasis and insertions added.)

     "Any definition of the word 'franchise' must include the word
'privileges'."  Willamette Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Bank of British
Columbia, Or., 119 U. S. 191. (Italics added.)

     "A franchise is bi-lateral in nature and imposes obligations
[duties] while conferring rights [privileges], so that acceptance
is necessary to prove that grantee has undertaken those
obligations."  Greenberg v. City of New York, 274 N. Y. S. 4.
(Insertions added.)

     "A franchise is a privilege in which the public have an
interest, and which cannot be exercised without the authority of
the sovereign."  People v. Utica Insurance Co. (1818), 15 Johns.
358.

     "The act of 1902, under which the assessment complained of was
made, provides for a tax on franchises, rights, and privileges, and
not on tangible property, income, business, or capital. A franchise
is a grant of right by public authority, the main element of which
is, in general, "permission" to do something which otherwise the
grantee would not have the right to do."  Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Wright (1910), 185 Fed. Rep. 250, 253.

     "It is hardly necessary to do more than recall the fundamental
principle established in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat.
518,. . . that a franchise is a contract between the grantor and
the grantee."  D. C. Transit System v. Pearson (1957), 149 Fed.
Supp. 18, 24.

     "What is a franchise? Under English law, Blackstone defines it
as 'a royal privilege or a branch of the King's prerogative,
subsisting in the hands of a subject.'"   State of California v.
Central Pacific R. R. Co. (1888), 8 S. C. 1073, 1080.

Police Powers

     "Police power may not be invoked under guise of general
welfare to interfere with sale by individual of his own property
when acquiring and possession of such property is not contrary to
law."  People v. Pace (1925), 73 C.A. 548, 559, 238 P. 1089.

     "State has, under its police powers, right to relieve itself
of any obnoxious class of population; and this has never been
denied."  In Re Perkins (1852), 2 C. 424.

     "Domestic commerce is subject to the police power of the
states."  In Re Abel, 77 P. 621, 10 Idaho 288.

     "To justify the state in thus interposing its authority on
behalf of the public, it must appear:
          1. That the interests of the public generally, as
          distinguished from those of a particular class, require
          such interference.
          2. That the means are reasonably necessary for the
          accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive
          upon individuals.
     "The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the
public interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or
impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful
occupations. Its determination as to what is a proper exercise of
its police powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to
supervision of the courts."  Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133.

     "Moreover, a distinction must be observed between the
regulation of an activity which may be engaged in as a matter of
right, and one carried on by government sufferance or permission.
In the latter case, the power to exclude altogether generally
includes the lesser power to condition and may justify a degree of
regulation not admissible in the former."  Davis v. Massachusetts,
167 U. S. 43.

     "Definitions of the police power must, however, be taken
subject to the condition that the state cannot, it its exercise,
for any purpose whatever encroach upon the powers of the general
government, or the rights secured by the supreme law of the land."
New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U. S. 650, 651.

     "The police power, according to its largest definition, is
restricted in its exercise by the National Constitution, as is
further shown by those cases in which grants of exclusive
privileges respecting public highways and bridges over navigable
streams have been sustained as contracts, the obligations of which
are fully protected from impairment by state enactments."  New
Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., ibid., p. 663.

     "The police power is not a universal solvent by which all
constitutional guarantees and limitations can be loosened and set
aside, regardless of their clear and plain meaning, nor is it a
substitute for those guarantees."  Goldman v. Crowther, 128 A 50.

     "A claim that action is being taken under the police powers of
the state cannot justify disregard of constitutional inhibitions."
Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. v. State Highway Commission, 294 U.
S. 613.

     "It is settled that the constitutional rights protected from
invasion of the police power include rights safeguarded by both the
express and implied prohibitions in the Constitutions."  Tighe v.
Osborne, 131 A 801; State v. Marble, 73 N. E. 1063; State v.
Redmon, 114 N.W. 137.

14th Amendment citizenship related to taxation

     "A tax is an enforced contribution to sovereign exacted
pursuant to legislative authority and not as a voluntary payment or
donation."
Arizona Department of Revenue v. Transamerica Title Insurance Co.,
604 P. 2d 1139.

     ". . . (E)very taxpayer is a cestui qui trust having
sufficient interest in the preventing abuse of the trust to be
recognized in the field of this court's prerogative jurisdiction as
a relator in proceedings to set sovereign authority in motion. . .
"  In Re Bolens (1912), 135 N.W. 164.

     "As a general rule, every citizen of the United States,
regardless of his residence, and every resident of the United
States, regardless of his citizenship, is taxable on his income
without respect to its geographic source.  The constitutional power
to impose the tax on such a world wide basis is sustained by Cook
v. Tait (1924), 265 U.S. 47, 44 S.Ct. 444."  Cases and Materials on
Federal Taxation (1955), by Paul W. Bruton and Raymond J. Bradley,
edited by Warren A. Seavey, West Publishing Co., p. 115.

"Taxpayers are not [de jure] State Citizens."  Belmont v. Town of
Gulfport, 122 So. 10.  (This decision regards a poll tax.)

Due Process Under the 14th Amendment

     "The right of trial by jury in civil cases, guaranteed by the
7th Amendment (Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90), and the right to
bear arms, guaranteed by the 2nd Amendment (Presser v. Illinois,
116 U. S. 252), have been distinctly held not to be privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States guaranteed by the 14th
Amendment against abridgement by the states, and in effect the same
decision was made in respect of the guarantee against prosecution,
except by indictment of a grand jury, contained in the 5th
Amendment (Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516), and in respect of
the right to be confronted with witnesses, contained in the 6th
Amendment."  West v. Louisiana, 194 U. S. 258.

     "In Maxwell v. Dow, supra, where the plaintiff in error had
been convicted by a state court of a felony upon an information,
and by a jury of eight persons, it was held that the indictment,
made indispensable by the 5th Amendment, and the trial by jury
guaranteed by the 6th Amendment were not privileges and immunities
of citizens of the United States, as those words were used in the
14th Amendment. . . .(T)he decision rested upon the ground that
this clause of the 14th Amendment did not forbid the states to
abridge the personal rights enumerated in the first eight
amendments, because these rights were not within the meaning of the
clause "privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States.". . . We conclude, therefore, that the exemption from
compulsory self-incrimination is not a privilege or immunity of
national citizenship guaranteed by this clause of the 14th
Amendment against abridgement by the states. . . .It is possible
that some of the first personal rights safeguarded by the first
eight amendments against national action may also be safeguarded
against state action, because a denial of them would be a denial of
due process of law. . . .If this is so, it is not because those
rights are enumerated in the first eight amendments but because
they are of such a nature that they are included in the conception
of due process of law." Twining, supra, pp. 98-99.

     "Due process requires that the court which assumes to
determine the rights of parties shall have jurisdiction. . . and
that there shall be notice and opportunity for hearing given the
parties. . . subject to these two fundamental conditions. . .
.(T)his court has. . . sustained all state laws, statutory or
judicially declared, regulating procedure, evidence, and methods of
trial, and held them to be consistent with due process of law. . .
"Among the most notable of these decisions are those sustaining the
denial of jury trial both in civil and criminal cases, the
substitution of information for indictments by a grand jury, the
enactment that the possession of policy slips raises a presumption
of illegality, and the admission of the deposition of an absent
witness in a criminal case."  Twining, supra, pp. 110-111.

     "The technical niceties of the common law are not regarded. .
. .", 1 R.C.L.  31, p. 422. "A jury does not figure, ordinarily,
in the trial of an admiralty suit. . . the verdict of the jury
merely advisory, and may be disregarded by the court." 1 R.C.L. 
40, p. 432. "[The] rules of practice may be altered whenever found
to be inconvenient or likely to embarrass the business of the
court." 1 R.C.L. 32, p. 423. "A court of admiralty. . . acts upon
equitable principles." 1 R.C.L. 17, p. 416. "A libel of
information [accusation] does not require all the technical
precision of an indictment at common law. If the allegations
describe the offense, it is all that is necessary; and if it is
founded upon a statute, it is sufficient if it pursues the words of
the law." The Emily v. The Caroline, 9 Wheat. 381 (Insertion
added).

     "But it is clear that the 14th Amendment in no way undertakes
to control the power of the state to determine by what process
legal rights may be asserted or legal obligations be enforced,
provided the method of procedure adopted gives reasonable notice
and affords fair opportunity to be heard before the issues are
decided;. . . Due process of law, guaranteed by the 14th Amendment,
does not require the state to adopt a particular form of procedure,
so long as it appears that the accused has had sufficient notice of
the accusation and an adequate opportunity to defend himself in the
prosecution."  Twining, supra, p. 112.

     "It is impossible to reconcile the reasoning of these cases
and the rule which governed their decision with the theory that an
exemption from compulsory self-incrimination is included in the
conception of due process of law. Indeed, the reasoning for
including indictment by a grand jury and trial by petit jury in
that conception, which has been rejected by this court in Hurtado
v. California and Maxwell v. Dow, was historically and principle
much stronger. Clearly appreciating this, Mr. Justice Harlan, in
his dissent in each of these cases, pointed out that the inexorable
logic of the reasoning of the court was to allow the states, so far
as the Federal Constitution was concerned, to compel any person to
be a witness against himself. In Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 22,
Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking for the whole court, said, in effect,
that the 14th Amendment would not prevent a state from adopting or
continuing the civil law instead of the common law. This dictum has
been approved and made an essential part of the reasoning of the
decision in Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 387, 389, and Maxwell v.
Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 598. The statement excludes the possibility
that the privilege is essential to due process, for it hardly need
be said that the interrogation of the accused at his trial is the
practice of the civil law."  Twining, supra, p. 113.

Due Process of 14th Amendment not applicable to State Citizens

     "A state neither loses any of its rights nor is discharged
from any of its duties by a change in the civil government. The
body politic is still the same, though it may have a different
organ of communication."  Snow, Cases in International Law, p. 21.

     "The states had guarded the privilege to the satisfaction of
their own people up to the adoption of the 14th Amendment. No
reason is perceived why they cannot continue to do so. The power of
their people ought not to be fettered, and their capacity of sober
and restrained self-government weakened by forced construction of
the Federal Constitution. "  Twining, supra, p. 114.

     "Plaintiffs in error have no just complaint on the basis of
any want of due process of law. The 14th Amendment does not profess
to secure to all persons in the United States the benefit of the
same laws and the same remedies."  Twining v. New Jersey, supra, p.
90. (Italics added.)

     "Different tribunals for different persons: When the
protection of equal laws equally administered has been enjoyed, it
cannot be said that there has been a denial of the equal protection
of the law within the purview of the 14th Amendment, only because
the state has allowed one person to seek one forum and has not
allowed another person, asserted to be in the same class, to seek
the same forum, although as to both persons the law has afforded a
forum in which the same and equal laws are applicable and
administered."  United States Federal Statutes Annotated (1888),
Volume 9, p. 551.

See also Admiralty.

14th Amendment not Constitutionally Ratified by the States

State v. Phillips (1975), 540 P.2d. 936 & Dyett v. Turner (1968),
439 P.2d 266 (where the courts questioned the lawful validity of
the 14th Amendment's ratification).

Pinckney G. McElwee, "THE 14TH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES AND THE THREAT THAT IT POSES TO OUR DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNMENT", 11 S. C. L. Q. 484 (1959).

Walter J. Suthon, Jr. "THE DUBIOUS ORIGIN OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT", 28 Tul. L. Rev. 22 (1953).